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1 Two Notions of Common Knowledge
Common knowledge is widely used in economic theory, theoretical computer
science, linguistics, and philosophy. It has been invoked in explanations
of rational coordination, in characterizations of joint attention and shared
intention, in theories of communication, speaker meaning, innuendo, and the
context of conversations, as well as in analyses of conventions, social norms,
and social groups.1
The expression “common knowledge” in fact has two, distinct, technical
uses.2 Jane Heal introduces the “informal” notion of common knowledge by
way of the following case:
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1For coordination, see Lewis (1969), Heal (1978), Moses (1986), Halpern & Moses
(1990), Fagin et al. (1995, Ch. 6, Ch. 11), Fagin et al. (1999), Morris (2002), Morris
(2014), Heinemann et al. (2004), Thomas et al. (2014). For joint attention, see Peacocke
(2005) (although cf. Campbell (2002, Ch. 8)). For shared intention, see Tuomela & Miller
(1988, p. 375), Bratman (1992, p. 335 with n. 15), Bratman (1993, passim, with n. 8),
Bratman (2014, p. 5 with n. 9), Fine (2012), cf. Gilbert (1990, p. 3). For communication
and speaker meaning, see Strawson (1964), Grice (1969), Schiffer (1972), Sperber et al.
(1986), and Jankovic (2014). For innuendo, see Clark (1979), Pinker (2007), Pinker et al.
(2008), Lee & Pinker (2010). For conversational context, see Radford (1969), Stalnaker
(1978, 1998, 2002, 2014), Clark (1996), cf. Ko¨lbel (2011). For conventions, see Lewis
(1969, 1975). For social norms, see Bicchieri & Muldoon (2014) and references therein.
For social groups, see Gilbert (1989). A number of concrete examples of social practices
are discussed in Chwe (2001) (see also Friedell (1969)).
2Neither of these technical senses is supposed to explicate the ordinary language uses
of the expression “common knowledge”, for example, the sense in which facts in an ency-
clopedia are common knowledge.
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Suppose that you and I are dining together. At the next table,
clearly audible to both of us, another diner begins a loud quarrel
with his companion. You catch my eye and make a grimace of
distaste. Contrast this with another situation. You and I are
again dining together. I messily drop a piece of potato on the
table. I attempt to field it inconspicuously and hope you have
not noticed. In fact you have noticed, but out of regard for my
feelings you pretend that you have not.
There is a clear difference between the two situations. In the first
the beginning of the quarrel is completely open, public, or, as I
shall say, it is common knowledge between us that a quarrel has
broken out. In the second case my bungling is not similarly open.
(1978, p. 116)
A second, “formal” notion of common knowledge is defined as follows.
Some people commonly know that p if and only if they all know that p, they
all know that they all know that p, they all know that they all know that they
all know that p, and so on. Related notions can be defined using “believe” and
“is certain that”, as well as other propositional attitudes. For example, some
people commonly believe that p if and only if they all believe that p, they all
believe that they all believe that p, and so on. Often, especially in economic
theory (and almost without exception in economic theory from the 1980s
and 1990s), the expression “common knowledge” is used generically to mean
“common knowledge, common belief, or common certainty” (where someone
is certain that p just in case they assign p probability 1). Thus authors
speak of “common knowledge assumptions” where the assumptions may not
require knowledge at all. I will sometimes use “common knowledge” in this
more general way to simplify the presentation, but where it is important I will
mark distinctions between common knowledge, common belief, and common
certainty.
To avoid confusion, I will use the expression “public information” for the
first, “informal” notion of common knowledge introduced by the example
from Heal.3 From here on, I will use the term “common knowledge” only for
the second, formal notion. The reader should be aware, however, that what
I call “public information” is often called “common knowledge” by other
authors.
3This is also intended as a technical term. For example, I take it that “public in-
formation” as it used to describe corporate disclosures is not synonymous with “public
information” in this sense.
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These two different notions give rise to different questions. It is reasonable
to ask (as Heal does) whether one can give a clear psychological characteri-
zation of public information, and if so, what that characterization is. These
questions do not arise for (the formal notion of) common knowledge, since
this already comes with a clear psychological characterization. But common
knowledge comes with its own set of questions. Do people ever have it? Even
if they do, does it play an important role in human social interactions?
While the two notions of common knowledge are conceptually distinct,
the default position in the literature has been that they coincide. According
to this Default Position, some people have public information that p just in
case they have common knowledge that p.
This article focuses on conceptual issues related to this Default Position.
In Section 2, I consider an influential argument in favor of the position. In
Section 3, I consider an influential argument against it. In Section 4, I discuss
how one might use a famous formal example, the electronic mail game, to
argue for or against the position.
I will not discuss the mathematics of common knowledge, or its uses in
game theory and computer science in any detail. Excellent surveys of these
issues can be found in other places. Geanakoplos (1994) is accessible and
highly recommended. Vanderschraaf & Sillari (2014) touches on many issues
which I cannot discuss here. For those wishing to delve deeper into the logic
of common knowledge, the excellent textbook Fagin et al. (1995) remains
the best starting point; for those specifically interested in game theory, Dekel
& Siniscalchi (2015) is a useful recent survey. I have not made any attempt
to be systematic in my references in this article.
2 An Argument for the Default Position
An influential argument for the Default Position proceeds by way of a series
of examples; I’ll use those from the recent paper of Greco (2015):4
public announcement: A professor tells her class that they
will play the following game. Without communicating to one
another in any way, each student in the class will write down the
name of a US state on a piece of a paper. If all students write the
4I will present the argument using the notion of public information, although Greco
himself does not. Early versions of this argument can be found in Heal (1978) and Clark
& Marshall (1981). Throughout this section I focus on common knowledge, but all of the
considerations I describe could also be applied, mutatis mutandis to common belief.
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same state name, with the exception of the name of the state the
class is taking place in, the students will each receive $10. If any
two students write down different state names, or if they all write
down the name of the state the class is taking place in, no prize
money will be awarded. Before handing out the pieces of paper,
the professor tells the class that she grew up in Maine (which is
not the state the class is taking place in), and that it is lovely in
the fall. (Greco (2015, p. 755))
Contrast this case with the following:
private information: Just like the previous case, except in-
stead of publicly announcing that she grew up in Maine, the
professor whispers the following to each student privately as she
hands out the pieces of paper: “while I’m not telling anybody
else this, I’d like you to know that I grew up in Maine, and it is
lovely in the fall.” (Greco (2015, p. 756))
In the first case, the fact that the professor grew up in Maine has the
“openness” or “publicity” that Heal describes in her example; the students
have public information that the professor grew up in Maine. In the second
case, the fact that the professor grew up in Maine is not “open” in the same
way; the students do not have public information of this fact.
A theory of public information should explain this contrast. Prior to
reading the above examples on might have been attracted to the simple
view that some people have public information that p just in case they all
know that p. But private information is a counterexample to this simple
theory. In private information, the students all know that the professor
is from Maine. But intuitively this fact is not “open” to them.
In response to this counterexample, one might propose adding a second
“layer” of knowledge: some people have public information that p just in
case they all know that they all know (two occurrences of “know”) that p.
But the following elaboration of private information appears to be a
counterexample to this new proposal, as well:
more private information: Just like the previous case, ex-
cept this is what the professor whispers: “I’m privately telling
everybody in the class that I grew up in Maine and that it’s
lovely in the fall. However, you’re the only one who I’m telling
that I’m telling everyone. Each other student thinks that she’s
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the only one who knows that I grew up in Maine.” (Greco (2015,
p. 756))
Here, the students presumably all know that they all know that the pro-
fessor is from Maine. But nevertheless there is a felt difference between
more private information and public announcement: in the former,
the students do not seem to have public information that the professor is
from Maine.
To consider generalizations of this style of argument, it will be useful to
have some terminology. Some people mutually know (or: mutually know1)
that p just in case they all know that p. Since everyone in my department
knows that the department office is on the tenth floor, the members of my
department mutually know1 that the department office is on the tenth floor.
Progressing further, some people mutually know2 that p just in case they all
know that they all know that p. Since everyone in my department knows that
everyone in my department knows that the department office is on the tenth
floor, the members of my department mutually know2 that the department
office is on the tenth floor. And we can continue: some people mutually know3
that p just in case they all know that they all know that they all know that
p. Since everyone in my department knows that everyone in my department
knows that everyone in my department knows that the department office is
on the tenth floor, the members of my department mutually know3 that the
department office is on the tenth floor.
Extending this pattern, in general some people mutually known that p
just in case they mutually know that they mutually known−1 it.5 We can use
these definitions to give a compact characterization of common knowledge:
some people commonly know that p just in case for all n, they mutually
known that p.
The examples given so far seem to show that people may have mutual
knowledge2 that p, although they do not have public information that p.
But many authors have agreed that the examples can be extended to show
in general that for any n, mutual knowledgen does not suffice for public in-
formation. To give a sense of how the generalization proceeds, we can give a
related example for mutual knowledge3 by altering the teacher’s announce-
ment:
even more private information: Just like the previous case,
5In older work, e.g. Schiffer (1972), “mutual knowledge” is sometimes used synony-
mously with “common knowledge”. But the terminology in the main text has now become
standard; see, e.g. Fagin et al. (1995).
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except this is what the professor whispers: “I’m privately telling
everybody in the class that I grew up in Maine and that it’s lovely
in the fall and that I have told everyone this. However, you’re
the only one who I’m telling that I’m telling everyone that I’ve
told everyone. Each other student thinks that she’s the only one
who knows that everyone knows that I grew up in Maine.”
The basic recipe should now be clear. For each n, one can alter the
professor’s secret so that it seems the students would be able to achieve
mutual knowledgen that the professor is from Maine, although they would
not intuitively have public information that the professor is from Maine.
The argument based on these cases is thus in the first instance a negative
one. A natural analysis of public information states that (for some fixed k)
some people have public information that p just in case they have mutual
knowledgek that p. The argument casts doubt on analyses of this form: it
appears to show that for any n, no matter how great, mutual knowledgen is
insufficient for public information.6
This negative argument can be resisted. The technical notion of public
information was introduced on the basis of examples such as Heal’s; the
notion does not come with hard and fast rules for how it is to be extended to
cases such as even more private information. It does not make sense
to appeal to “intuitions” here. Rather, in thinking about how to extend
the notion we must consider which way of extending it fits best with the
theoretical work we want the notion to do. It is at least possible that the
most theoretically fruitful extension of this concept gives the result that the
people in even more public information (or some later case in the
sequence) do have public information, at least if all goes well.
But there might seem to be strong reasons for not extending the concept
in this way. For if we did so extend it, we might seem to be left without a way
of explaining the undeniable felt contrast between public announcement
and the subsequent cases. This concern, however, is not as powerful as it
might seem. To see this, consider a proponent of mk4, the view that people
have public information that p just in case they have mutual knowledge4
that p. In response to an elaboration of even more private information
6In the cases I have taken from Greco, if the students have mutual knowledgen that the
professor is from Maine, they also falsely believe that they do not have mutual knowledgen
that the professor is from Maine. Having the announcement generate this additional false
belief simplifies the presentation (and strengthens the intuition), but it is inessential.
We could alter this aspect of the teacher’s announcement, while preserving the intuitive
difference between public announcement and the other cases.
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intended to be a counterexample to mk4, the proponent of this view might
argue as follows: “The students will have mutual knowledge4 if, and (let us
suppose) only if, they (a) understand the secret told to them, (b) believe what
the teacher says, (c) know that everyone else will understand the secret, and
(d) know that everyone else will believe them. Let us set aside (b) and (d): for
present purposes we may grant that if the students understood the speeches
they would believe them. Still, (a) and (c) may present difficulties. People in
the students’ shoes will not always understand the complex statements they
are told about others’ epistemic states (e.g. ‘I told the others I was telling
everyone that I was telling everyone that I’m from Maine.’). This would
result in a failure of (a). More often, a person in the students’ position may
be uncertain whether on hearing ‘I told everyone that I told everyone that I
am from Maine’, the others will understand that all the students know that
all the students know that the teacher is from Maine (a failure of (c)). The
difficulty of understanding statements of this form has been documented in
the empirical literature.7 Readers of these cases typically believe that the
students do not satisfy (a) or (c), and thus they typically judge that the
students do not have mutual knowledge4 that the professor is from Maine.
It is for this reason that readers of the cases judge the students not to have
public information of this fact. The example is thus not a counterexample at
all; the judgments readers report are exactly in line with my theory.” This
proponent of mk4 might further claim that if one focuses on cases where
the students do satisfy (a)-(d), the felt contrast disappears. Or she might
propose a kind of error theory, stating that the difficulty of satisfying (a)-(d)
makes it natural to judge incorrectly that the students fail to have public
information in the case so described.
This style of response to the argument in fact has considerable appeal.
But it has not been much discussed in the literature, so from now on we will
set it aside.8 In the remainder of this essay, then, we will suppose that the
negative argument succeeds. How can this negative argument be extended to
a positive argument for the claim that public information requires common
knowledge? The most obvious way of doing so uses a further premise: that
public information in this case is to be analyzed solely in terms of what the
7In Kinderman et al. (1998), Stiller & Dunbar (2007), people were found to be es-
sentially at chance in remembering reports involving six nested attitudes. So even if the
reader is unhappy with this response to this case, it becomes even more plausible for (e.g.)
mutual knowledge7.
8For a different kind of argument against the view that people have public information
that p just in case they have mutual knowledgek that p, see Heal (1978, p. 125).
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students know about where the professor comes from, and what they know
about what others know about where the professor comes from, and so on.
Given this additional premise, if we can rule out all finite levels of mutual
knowledge, we will have shown that common knowledge is required for public
information.
One might, however, reject the new premise of this extended, positive
argument. The sense of openness or publicity in the examples might derive
from features of the situation other than how many levels of mutual knowl-
edge are present. For example, situations might fail to produce a sense of
“openness” simply when they are confusing, unusual or unfamiliar to the
participants. The above cases involve very unusual statements on the part
of the professor, and that is why (according to the suggested criterion) that
they do not produce the relevant kind of openness. A full development of
this approach would require a more systematic explanation of what these
other factors are; “unusual” is hardly an informative characterization. But
the general strategy for rejecting this new premise again seems at least prima
facie appealing, and again has not received much discussion.9
3 Problems with the Default Position?
Although these arguments have been taken by many authors to motivate
the idea that common knowledge is at least importantly related to public
information, some of the same authors have also been suspicious that public
information requires common knowledge itself. The most common concern
has been that because common knowledge requires knowledge of an infinite
collection of claims it is impossible for finite creatures to have common knowl-
9 This alternative strategy might be supported by the suggestion that the examples
above prove too much: one can construct an elaboration of them that might suggest that
even common knowledge would be insufficient for public information:
supertask secrets: As in even more private information, but the
teacher programs a computer to broadcast the message to the students, and
the computer and students are all capable of supertasks. At first the students
receive a message which simply says that the teacher is from Maine. After
this, at intervals of 12n seconds each student’s screen displays a new line,
saying: pthe others knows that together you have mutual knowledgen that
the teacher is from Maine, but does not know that you know thisq.
This case is hard to think about it. But some may be inclined to claim that, although
the super-students have common knowledge that the professor is from Maine, they do not
have public information of this fact.
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edge. Heal (1978) and Clark & Marshall (1981) are good examples of early
skepticism on these grounds; Clark for example has written: “CG-iterated
[that is, common belief] obviously cannot represent people’s mental states
because it requires an infinitely large mental capacity...” (1996, 95-6).
In this passage, Clark is concerned with how we should “represent com-
mon ground”. In context, it is clear that by “represent” he means “give a
theory of”, and that “common ground” is used here loosely for public in-
formation. The objection is not particularly powerful. People often believe
every member of an infinite collection of claims. For every natural number
n > 0, I believe that no one has ever seen Santa Claus exactly n times. This
belief about how many times Santa Claus has been seen is clearly possible, in
spite of the fact that it involves believing an infinite set of claims. So observ-
ing that common knowledge or belief is somehow infinite does not seem to
be an interesting objection to the possibility of common knowledge or belief.
Nevertheless, in response to this and related objections, there has been a
great deal of discussion of alternative analyses of public information which
do not require that people know an infinite collection of claims. Although
these analyses do not require that people in fact have common knowledge,
they do imply that ideal agents would have common knowledge were they to
have public information. In other words, they imply:
ideal common knowledge: Necessarily, if some agents have common
knowledge that they are ideal reasoners, then if they have public infor-
mation that p, they commonly know that p.10
The Default Position is the benchmark position in the literature; it is
almost invariably the starting point of discussions about common knowledge
and public information. But few people accept the Default Position as it
stands. By contrast, almost every author who has discussed public informa-
tion at any length accepts ideal common knowledge (or a related thesis
about common belief).
An important example of such a theory can be motivated using the notion
of “the scene”. In the opening example from Heal, there is some sense in
which the diners both know the scene which is unfolding around them. The
obvious features of what they can see and hear – the color of the table cloth,
the location of the bar in the restaurant, whether there is music playing or
not – are all part of the scene. Not every detail, of course, must be part
10Margaret Gilbert comes closest to advocating this thesis in so many words; Gilbert
(1989, p. 186-197) cf. Gilbert (2008)).
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of the scene: details of the ornamentation of the ceiling or the color of the
waiters’ shoes may not be part of the scene in this sense. But it is supposed
to be part of the scene that both diners are normal perceivers attentive to
the world around them. In other words, it is part of the scene that they each
know the scene.
What does it mean to be “part of the scene”? One explication of this
abstract idea states that for something to be part of the scene is for the scene
to entail it. Thus we have:
shared environment: Some people have public information that p just
in case there is an E (“environment”) such that it is the case that E,
E entails that p, and E entails that everyone knows that E.11
Under plausible assumptions about entailment, and assuming that ideal
knowledge is closed under entailment, this definition will satisfy ideal com-
mon knowledge. Informally, the basic idea is as follows. The scene entails
that there is a quarrel happening beside the diners. The scene also entails
that both diners know the scene. Thus the scene entails that both diners
know something which entails that both diners know that there is a quar-
rel beside them. But since the scene also entails that both know the scene,
it further entails that both know something which entails that both know
something which entails that both know that there is a quarrel. And we can
continue to add iterations of “know something which entails” ad infinitum.
Given that ideal agents’ knowledge is closed under entailment, in the case
of ideal agents we can replace each occurrence of “know something which
entails” with “know”. The formal details of an argument to this effect are
sketched in a footnote.12
11This approach is most closely associated with the work of Barwise (1988); cf. Mertens
& Zamir (1985). Further definitions of a related kind may be found in: Lewis (1969)
(cf. Cubitt & Sugden (2003) and Paternotte (2011)); Harman (1977, p. 422) (cf. Harman
(1974, p. 225), Peacocke (2005, p. 307-8).); Heal (1978); Milgrom (1981), and Clark &
Marshall (1981), Clark & Carlson (1982). Lismont & Mongin (2003) gives a clear, simple
presentation of some definitions in this family.
12For simplicity I use a language that allows quantification into sentence position, and
take “entails that” (somewhat unnaturally) to be a binary sentential operator. The ar-
gument is not particularly delicate and could be conducted in many other settings, for
example, using only first-order quantification, a notion of propositional truth, and entail-
ment understood as a relation between propositions.
First some definitions: q is mutually entailed by what some agents know if there is a p
such that they mutually know that p, and p entails that q; q is mutuallyn entailed by what
some agents know if there is a p such that they mutually know p, and p entails that q is
mutuallyn−1 entailed by what they know. Finally q is commonly entailed by what some
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Earlier I suggested that at least one motivation for these alternatives to
common knowledge itself is not as strong as it has been taken to be. But
there other ways of using these alternative analyses of public information.
My infinite collection of beliefs about Santa Claus is plausibly in some sense
explained by my having a more basic belief, namely, that no one has ever seen
Santa Claus. What is the corresponding “basic belief” in the case of common
belief? If this talk of “basic beliefs” is cashed out in terms of how beliefs are
agents know just in case for all n, q is mutuallyn entailed by what they know.
We can show that if some people satisfy shared environment with regard to p, then
p is commonly entailed by what they know, using four additional assumptions about en-
tailment. The first assumption relies on the idea that propositions are closed under a
countable conjunction operation: entailment conjunction-in: if p entails that qa for
every qa ∈ {qa}a∈A where A is countable, then p entails that
∧
a∈A qa. Second, detach-
ment: if q and q entails that p, then p. Third, entailment of entailment: if p entails
that q, then r entails that [p entails that q]. Fourth, existential introduction: if p
entails that ϕ(q), where q is a sentence variable, then p entails that ∃rϕ(r), where ∃ is a
quantifier for the type of sentences, and r is a variable of the corresponding type. This
fourth principle allows quantifying in, in sentence position: if p entails that S knows q,
then p entails that there is something S knows.
Given the above laws, we first prove a lemma: if p entails that everyone knows that
q, and if q entails that s, then p entails that there is an r such that [everyone knows
that r, and r entails that s]. The proof first uses entailment of entailment, then
entailment conjunction-in, and finally existential introduction.
Now, given shared environment, and supposing that some agents have public infor-
mation that p, there is an E such that E entails that everyone knows E and such that E
entails that p. So by the lemma, E entails that there is an r such that everyone knows
that r and such that r entails that p. That’s the base case of an induction: E entails that
p is mutually1 entailed by what everyone knows. Now for the induction hypothesis, we
suppose that E entails that p is mutuallyn entailed by what all know, and show that E
entails that p is mutuallyn+1 entailed by what all know. Since E entails that all know that
E, and by hypothesis E entails that p is mutuallyn entailed by what they know, then again
by the lemma, E entails that there is some r such that they all know r and r entails that p
is mutuallyn entailed by what all know. So, by definition E entails that p is mutuallyn+1
entailed by what everyone knows. This induction shows that for all n, E entails that p
is mutuallyn entailed by what all know, so by entailment conjunction-in, E entails
that p is commonly entailed by what they know. Given that the agents in fact have public
information that p, it is the case that E, so by detachment p is commonly entailed by
what they know.
If the agents in question are ideal, and ideal knowledge is closed under entailment (in
the sense that if p entails that q and the agent knows that p then the agent knows that q),
the same argument can be used to show that they have common knowledge that p, and
not merely that p is commonly entailed by what they know. Perhaps a more plausible
assumption, that ideal knowledge is closed only under known entailments, would require
different background assumptions; the point here has just been to give a worked example
of how this kind of view implies ideal common knowledge.
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cognitively represented, answering this question would mean offering a theory
of how common knowledge and common belief are cognitively represented.
Perhaps shared environment could be suitably modified to provide such
an account.
While some have worried that common belief would be too hard to achieve,
others have argued that in fact common belief is easier to achieve than mutual
beliefk for only finite k. Robert Stalnaker, for example, writes:
Instead of thinking of beliefs and presuppositions in terms of sen-
tences that express them, in the language of thought, stored in
the belief or presupposition box of the mind, think of them nega-
tively: it is the live options – the space of possibilities one allows
for – that need to be represented. One’s beliefs or presupposi-
tions are the propositions that are true in all of those possibilities.
What would put an unrealistic computational load on the mind
would be a situation in which one believed, up to six iterations,
that one believed that, but failed to believe the seventh itera-
tion. That would require representing a possible situation (and a
representation of the complex relational structure of possibilities
compatible with possibilities that are compatible with possibili-
ties compatible with...etc.) in which this mind-bogglingly subtle
distinction is made. Infinitely iterated beliefs and presuppositions
are much simpler for the subject to represent, and to understand.
(Stalnaker (2009, 402-3))
Stalnaker’s own idea of representation is somewhat obscure. It is not clear
in what sense if any including “more” possibilities requires some “computa-
tional load”. For every n greater than or equal to zero, it is consistent with
what I believe that there are exactly n creatures living in the universe now
on planets other than earth: an infinite set of live possibilities which differ
with regard to the numbers of extraterrestrial creatures are really consistent
with my beliefs. Thus making these possibilities live cannot have imposed
an “unrealistic” computational load on my mind.
4 Common Knowledge and Coordination
In section 2, we saw an argument that mutual knowledgen is not sufficient for
public information. There, we were focused on the sense of openness that was
supposed to be the hallmark of public information. But one might also see
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the examples as the basis for a different argument, about rational action. In
public announcement, it is rational – perhaps rationally required – for the
students to write down “Maine”, and it is likely the students would coordinate
to win the prize money. In private information (and also in at least some
of the subsequent cases), this behavior does not seem rationally required,
and, moreover, it is unlikely that the students would be able to coordinate
on writing down “Maine”. One theoretical role for public information might
be to explain rational social behavior. For example, one might think that
in a range of situations it is rational for people to coordinate if and only
if they have public information of relevant facts about their situation. If
the examples show that finite levels of mutual knowledge are insufficient to
justify coordination, we might have a second, independent argument for the
Default Position.
But one might wonder: is it really true that the students would still fail
to coordinate in the four-hundredth case in this series? It might seem that,
whatever one’s views about the “openness” of the professor’s birthplace in
these examples, the students would eventually be able to coordinate. It is
quite difficult to think about rational behavior in such alien examples, so it
is natural to turn to formal, mathematical theories of rationality for help.
The famous “electronic mail game” (Rubinstein (1989)) is a formal example
in which it is irrational for players to coordinate if they have any finite level
of mutual knowledge, although it would be rational for them to coordinate
in the presence of common knowledge. At least in this example, rational
students would not coordinate even in the analogue of the four-hundredth
case in the series. I’ll present the example in very crude outline; readers who
want to understand the details should consult the original, highly accessible
paper.13
In the electronic mail game, Row and Column are uncertain which of two
smaller games, GA or GB, they are playing (see Figure 4.1). In the first, the
action (A) ensures a payoff of 0 to each player, regardless of what the other
player does. In the second, there is no such simple choice: the players each
receive a payoff of 1 if they both play B, and a payoff of 0 if they both play
A. If their actions don’t match, however, then the player who plays B alone
pays a penalty of 2.14
13Chant & Ernst (2008) and Lederman (forthcominga) give further discussion of the
philosophical import of arguments about the relationship between common knowledge
and coordination.
14I present a variant of the original electronic mail game, which appeared in Morris
(2002). Rubinstein used a slightly different game and obtained a slightly weaker result.
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Column
A B
Row A 0, 0 0,−2
B −2, 0 −2,−2
GA
Column
A B
Row A 0, 0 0,−2
B −2, 0 1, 1
GB
Figure 4.1 The Electronic Mail Game
The games are to be selected by the toss of a fair coin: with probability
1
2
, the game is GA, and with probability
1
2
the game is GB. But the players’
information about the outcome of the toss is asymmetric. Row will observe
the outcome of the toss. Column will not, but will learn about the outcome
by receiving messages from Row. If the game is selected to be GB, Row will
automatically send an email message to Column. If either Column or Row
receives an email message from the other, his or her computer automatically
sends a new message in reply. At each stage of this process, however, there is
a positive, equal and independent rate of the message failing; with probability
1 the process will be cut off at some point. And when it has ended, each
player will be told only the tally of the messages he or she sent.
A strategy for a player is a function from the natural numbers (the num-
ber of messages the player has sent) to the set of probability distributions
over actions (the set {A,B}). A strategy is rationalizable if and only if it
is consistent with the players’ having common certainty of one another’s ra-
tionality (in the sense of maximizing expected utility). We then have the
following result:
Theorem 4.1 (Rubinstein (1989)). For each player, the unique rationalizable
strategy is the constant function which takes every number of messages sent
to A.
In the example, coordination is impossible if people have only finite levels
of mutual certainty. Many have found this result highly counterintuitive.
After one message has been sent, each of the players is certain that the game
is GB – that is, they are certain that if they both played B, that would be
the best outcome for each of them. But, because they are not certain that
they are certain that the game is GB, they are certain that the other player
will not play B. The point carries over to higher message counts, too. If
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they each send two messages, they are certain that the game is GB, and in
fact certain that the other is certain of this. But even so they remain certain
that neither will play B.
In philosophy, perhaps the most common lesson that has been drawn
from this result is that common knowledge (or at least: common certainty) is
important for successful coordination. If the players had common knowledge
that the game is GB, it would clearly be rationally permitted for them to
coordinate on B. But if common knowledge fails in the way described in
the electronic mail game, they cannot rationally coordinate on B. So, some
have concluded, common knowledge must be important for coordination in
general.
There are, however, a number of ways of resisting this argument. Al-
though people cannot coordinate on the better outcome in the above situ-
ation it does not follow that common knowledge is important for rational
coordination in other situations. This point can be sharpened once we see
that the argument is sensitive to a number of highly unrealistic features of the
setup. For example, Rubinstein already recognized that if it is guaranteed
that communication will stop at some pre-ordained number of messages, it
becomes possible for players to coordinate rationally on B (Rubinstein (1989,
Remark 1, p. 388)). Since in everyday life, communication is always trun-
cated in this way, the example is crucially different from any situation people
would ordinarily encounter. A detailed study of consequences of this impor-
tant observation can be found in the elegant paper of Binmore & Samuelson
(2001).
In fact, on reflection, one might take the example to tell against the im-
portance of common knowledge, and not in favor of it. The background
assumptions for the above result (including common knowledge of rational-
ity) imply that in the standard technical sense of “rational” the only rational
action is to coordinate on A in this situation. But there is a powerful in-
tuition that this is not the only rational action. Instead of taking this case
to show that rational agents cannot coordinate, we might instead conclude
that the assumptions used in proving the result make the wrong predictions
about the case, so that these background assumptions should be rejected.
On this interpretation, the case yields an argument against the assumptions
of common certainty used to prove the result, not an argument for the role
of common certainty in everyday coordination (Lederman (forthcominga)).
One might take this to suggest that any doxastic state resembling com-
mon knowledge would impose overly strong demands on when agents could
coordinate. But this would be too quick. A person p-believes that q just
15
in case the person assigns q probability greater than or equal to p. It can
be shown that for particular choices of p, agents may have common p-belief
about the setup of the electronic mail game and common p-belief that they
are rational but nevertheless coordinate after finite numbers of messages have
been sent (Monderer & Samet (1989)). Thus one might take the argument
to show merely that the important notion for theories of behavior is common
p-belief, as opposed to common certainty (or common knowledge, or common
belief).15
We have seen arguments both for and against the prevalence of common
knowledge based on the electronic mail game. Other arguments related to
this issue are based on the use of common knowledge assumptions in the
social sciences more generally. Common knowledge assumptions can be seen
as part of simple, strong theories of human behavior. On the grounds that one
should generally put confidence in simple, strong hypotheses, one might hold
that there is at least a presumption in favor of the claim that people often
have a great deal of common knowledge. In reply to this argument, one might
argue that any such presumption is defeated by apparent counterexamples
to the truth of common knowledge assumptions, such as the false predictions
these hypotheses seem to generate in examples such as the electronic mail
game itself.
A different argument begins from the claim that the prevalence of models
which impose common knowledge assumptions in mathematical game theory
shows these assumptions to be part of the best social-scientific theory of hu-
man behavior. If one holds that what a person believes and knows is what he
or she believes and knows according to the best theory of his or her behavior,
then it would follow that people have a great deal of common knowledge and
belief.16 One could resist this argument by rejecting the theory of belief it is
based on, or (as above) by rejecting the premise that theories which include
common knowledge assumptions are in fact good theories of human behavior.
15Note that the standard technical notion of “common p-belief” is in fact defined by
analogy to shared environment, and not by analogy to the “iterated” definition given
at the start of this article. These definitions coincide if p = 1, but they come apart if
p < 1. For discussion of these differences see Morris (1999). Paternotte (2016) is a recent
discussion of differences between common belief and common p-belief, given one popular
way of relating belief and p-belief.
16For an argument of this kind, see Greco (2014a,b).
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5 Conclusion
This brief survey has left untouched a vast range of issues related to com-
mon knowledge. Even among the issues it has touched on, many questions
remain unsettled. There has not been enough philosophical work on the un-
derpinnings of social behavior to determine whether common knowledge or
even public information plays the roles it has been claimed to play. The
orthodoxy that common knowledge is importantly connected to public infor-
mation has not been subjected to sustained scrutiny. As a result there have
been few arguments for or against this orthodoxy. A start has been made in
some recent work arguing against ideal common knowledge (Lederman
(forthcomingb)), but this remains only a first step.
A good example of the uncertain state of play concerns one of the most
important applications of common knowledge and public information in phi-
losophy: the common ground of a conversation. In linguistics and the phi-
losophy of language, it is typically assumed that there is a body of shared
information among the participants in a conversation which plays an im-
portant role in determining what sentences will mean in context, and how
extra-semantic inferences will be drawn by conversational participants. It
is standardly assumed that this body of shared information is determined
roughly by what the participants commonly know (Stalnaker (2002, 2014),
cf. e.g. Pinker (2007), Pinker et al. (2008)). There have been few arguments
offered in favor of this position, however. It is unclear whether the linguistic
data require this assumption, or whether we can make do with something
weaker. If we can make do with something weaker, it is unclear what shape
this weaker characterization will take. There is a great deal of work to be
done.
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